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Abstract
This study aims to elicit smallholder farmers’ preferences for the design
of certification standards. We conducted a randomized conjoint analysis
(RCA) with 745 green smallholder tea farmers in Vietnam. This method
enables us to estimate the causal impacts of design attributes on farm-
ers’ participation, which is a knowledge gap addressed by few empirical
studies. Our results revealed that compared to the price premium, certifi-
cation fee has a much stronger impact on farmers’ participation. Further,
we find the potential to incorporate the application of organic fertilizer,
a widely recommended sustainable input, into the certification schemes.
Based on our causal findings, we suggest policies for improving the cover-
age of certification standards.
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1 Introduction
Various certification standards – e.g., Fairtrade, Organic, UTZ & Rainforest Alliance,
and Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) certificates – have been initiated for small-
holder farmers1 in developing countries (ITC, 2018). These standards require farmers
to follow a set of safe and sustainable agricultural practices. In return, farmers receive5
price premiums due to consumers’ higher willingness to pay for certified foods and
beverages (Marette et al., 2012; Rousseau and Vranken, 2013). With this market-
based mechanism, certification standards offer a promising path towards sustainable
agriculture in developing countries.
Vietnam, a developing country in the Southeast Asia, has also witnessed the de-10
velopment of certification standards for smallholder farmers in recent years. Inter-
national standards, such as GlobalGAP, Organic, and Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP), are implemented for a few food products (My et al., 2017).
Importantly, the government has developed a domestic certification standard named
VietGAP, which covers many agricultural commodities, including rice, tea, vegetables,15
and livestock. VietGAP is regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MARD), and the certificate is issued to voluntary groups of farmers by either
private companies or state agencies.
However, despite active promotion by the government and non-government organi-
zations (NGOs), the coverage of VietGAP remains very low. For example, only 5.5%20
of around 34,000 registered agricultural farms nationwide in 2017 (10 years after the
introduction) were VietGAP certified. Further, the certified planted area for a focused
commodity of VietGAP like tea was merely 3% in 20172.
Reasons for the low adoption rate of farmers still remain ambiguous, as empirical
studies often report either neutral or positive impacts of certification standards on25
farm income (see DeFries et al., 2017 and Oya et al., 2018 for reviews about impacts
of certification standards, and see Tran and Goto, 2019 and Bac et al., 2018 for par-
1Smallholder farms hereby refer to farms less than 2 ha, a broad definition proposed by
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation (FAO).
2The statistics were collected from MARD and the Vietnam General Statistics Office and
computed by the author.
2
ticular case studies in Vietnam). Some studies attempt to shed light on the issue by
exploring factors – mainly farm, household and contextual characteristics – correlated
with farmers’ participation decision(e.g., Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch et30
al., 2013). However, because causal interpretations are hardly be inferred from those
correlation findings, policy implications are often limited.
In this study, we take another approach to examine reasons as well as solutions to
the low coverage. Our study investigates, quantitatively, how much design attributes
of the certification standards affect farmers’ participation decisions. Certification pro-35
grams, like VietGAP, encompass two types of design attribute. The first type is about
the requirements including certification fee and radical changes in farming practice
(e.g., constrained use of agrochemicals, and keeping records of farm inputs and har-
vests). The second is tangible benefits in terms of price premiums, technical training,
and subsidized inputs. Quantitative knowledge of how much the requirements discour-40
age and how much the benefits encourage farmers’ participation could suggest which
overall design of certification programs is attractive (or not attractive) to smallholder
farmers. As such, governmental policy-makers and NGOs can have effective tools to
improve the coverage of certification programs.
Researchers have examined the importance of design attributes for other programs45
involving smallholder farmers, such as contract farming and soil conservation (e.g.,
Abebe et al., 2013; Ochieng et al., 2017; Marenya et al., 2014). Similar studies for cer-
tification are scarce. Meemken et al. (2017) is one of the only few studies to examine
the impacts of design attributes on farmers’ participation in certification standards.
However, since their study used a conventional choice experiment with d-optimal de-50
sign, the unbiased causal impacts of the design attributes could not be estimated.
To address this knowledge gap, we adopt new design of RCA – one type of choice
experiment – from Hainmueller et al. (2014) to evaluate the causal effects of certifi-
cation design on farmers’ participation. From June to July 2018, we conducted the
RCA with 745 Vietnamese households (i.e., family farms) which produce green tea on55
a small-scale. Tea is a major agricultural product of Vietnam, and small farmers own
up to 70% of the plantation area. The specific study site was in a northern province
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with the largest green tea planting area in Vietnam named Thai Nguyen. The active
development of certification programs for small tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, as we will
explain in section 2, offers contextual validity for our experiment.60
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives detailed justification
for our selected study sites. Methods for data sampling, choice experiment procedure,
and data analysis are explained in detail in section 3. Section 4 presents results from
the randomized conjoint analyses, and a discussion of the results is provided in section
5. Section 6 concludes and gives policy implications based on our key findings.65
2 The study site
Thai Nguyen, a province in the northern mountainous region of Vietnam, is our chosen
study site for conducting RCA to elicit farmers’ preferences for certification standards.
There are already several studies about certification standards for smallholder
green tea farmers conducted in Thai Nguyen (e.g., Tran and Goto, 2019; Bac et al.,70
2018) due to the compelling characteristics of the province. As mentioned in those
studies, Vietnam is a top tea producing country, and about 70% of the plantation area
is under small-scale farms. Thai Nguyen is biggest center for green tea production in
Vietnam. Tran and Goto (2019) further describe the recent development of certifica-
tion programs for tea in Vietnam and Thai Nguyen. Accordingly, as of March 2018,75
there were 68 VietGAP tea groups in operation in Vietnam, whereas there was only
one UTZ tea cooperative. Thai Nguyen was then home for 40 out of the 68 VietGAP
tea groups and the only UTZ tea cooperative. Thus, a large number of smallholder tea
farmers and the active development of tea certification standards make Thai Nguyen
a favourable site for our study.80
We conducted our RCA with smallholder tea farmers in Dai Tu district of Thai
Nguyen province. Dai Tu district, accounting for about 30 percent of Thai Nguyen’s
planted tea area, owns the largest green tea farming area in the province. As of Decem-
ber 2017, 16 VietGAP groups were newly established in the district, owing to subsidy
for certification fee from the local government. In total, Dai Tu had 20 VietGAP85
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groups, the largest number of VietGAP groups in Thai Nguyen. It was also evident
from our survey that most of tea farmers are aware of the VietGAP certification,
potentially because of the training programs implemented by the local agricultural
extension agencies. Given the high exposure of local farmers to VietGAP, the dis-
trict offers an ideal study site to investigate farmers’ preferences for the certification90
programs.
3 Methods
3.1 Sampling methods
This study is a part of a project with three following objectives: (i) to evaluate the
impacts of information provision and subsidy on farmers’ adoption of organic fertilizer95
by a randomized control trial (RCT), (ii) to elicit farmers’ preferences for the design
of VietGAP certification programs by an RCA, (iii) to evaluate the socio-economic
impacts of VietGAP on small-scale farmers. The RCA was conducted in a sub-sample
of the project’s full sample.
Data collection of the whole project followed a two-step procedure, village sampling100
and household sampling, to obtain data of 1287 tea-farming households. In the first
step, nine communes were selected in Dai Tu district which had newly established
VietGAP groups in December 20173. In each commune, we chose all villages with
active VietGAP groups and their neighboring villages without active VietGAP groups
4. In total, 30 villages were selected: four for a pilot survey and 26 for our main survey.105
In the second step, tea-farming households were randomly selected using villager
lists and VietGAP member lists provided by local officers. In each village, the survey
team visited 45 households during the main survey and 36 households during the pilot
3The purpose of this commune selection was to collect farm information before the inter-
vention, which was fundamental for the third objective of the project. We initially chose 10
communes, but only obtained permission to conduct the project in nine communes (namely,
Binh Thuan, Tien Hoi, Khoi Ky, Phu Xuyen, Van Yen, My Yen, Phu Cuong, Hoang Nong,
and La Bang).
4In Hoang Nong Commune, we conducted the project only in villages with VietGAP tea
groups following a request from the local government.
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survey5. In villages with an active VietGAP group (hereafter, VietGAP villages), the
survey included all VietGAP members group due to their relatively small numbers.110
The remaining households, if any, were randomly selected from the VietGAP non-
members. In villages without any active VietGAP groups (hereafter non-VietGAP
villages), 45 tea-farming households were selected.
Based on the list of 1287 households for the whole project, we further selected
a sub-sample of 750 households to conduct the RCA6. Due to the small number of115
the VietGAP members, compared to the non-members, we prioritized the sampling
of the former whenever possible. In detail, in VietGAP village, we randomly chose
35 VietGAP members from the member lists if possible. If the certified group size
was less than or equal to 35, all members joint the RCA. Further, we selected around
40 percent of the VietGAP non-members on the project list in both VietGAP and120
non-VietGAP villages. As a result, we chose 750 households for the RCA, including
301 VietGAP members and 449 non-members.
All selected households, regardless of their participation in the RCA, were home-
visited by our investigators7. The household representatives must be family mem-
bers who regularly made main decisions regarding tea farm production. If the house-125
hold representatives were not available during the visiting day, alternative households,
which were prepared in advance on the list, was selected as substitutes8.
5The number of sampled households in each village was not always as planned due to the
availability of the selected households or the insufficient number of tea farming households.
6We did not conduct the conjoint experiment on the whole project sample because of our
resource constraints. One important constraint was that in each village the survey must be
finished within one day. This was to prevent information spillover, a requirement of the RCT.
712 investigators who were students and staff in the Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture
and Forestry got engaged in the survey. In a two-day training, they were carefully instructed
about how to carry out the RCT, the RCA and the household survey using smartphone-based
questionnaires. Before the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted in 4 villages when the
investigators were practically trained. The investigators were always divided into two teams
of six. The two teams operated in two neighboring villages simultaneously on a working day.
8The lists of alternative households included non-selected households in the village were
sorted randomly.
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3.2 Randomized conjoint analysis
3.2.1 Selection of design attributes
A certification scheme is a package of requirements and benefits. Changes in those130
attributes might significantly improve (or hinder) the uptake of the program. We select
five attributes of the certification program and tested their impacts on the participation
of the small-scale tea farmers. Table 1 shows a list of the chosen attributes and their
definitions. The levels of each attribute are demonstrated in Table 2, where Level 1 –
the baseline level – corresponds to the status quo of the current VietGAP program in135
the study sites. This section justifies our choice of the five attributes.
The first attribute is certification fee. Payments from the farmers are necessary to
cover a third-party’s costs such as initial farm inspection, training, and monitoring.
An increase in the fee, obviously, reduces the outreach of the scheme. However, very
few studies investigated the sensitivity of small farmers to this very tangible cost.140
Such negligence could be because the certification fee is heavily subsidized by NGOs
or governments in many cases. The certification costs of the active VietGAP groups
in the study sites were also fully supported by the local government. Nonetheless,
it is still crucial to examine how farmers react to different fee levels to design better
subsidy and fee-sharing programs.145
The second attribute is a requirement of record keeping. Documentation of used in-
puts, harvests and sales is a foundation for traceability of the certified products, which
in turn might improve consumers’ trust in the labels. Farmers may also believe that
record-keeping is conducive to the effective management of their production. Meemken
et al. (2017) indeed found a positive effect of record-keeping on the participation rate.150
However, keeping a sufficient and credible record is notoriously challenging, even for
highly educated farmers. Hence, the impact of this attribute remains ambiguous.
The next three are hypothetical attributes related to organic fertilizer. Soil degra-
dation due to the overuse of chemical fertilizer is prevalent in tea and other crops
farming in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2017). A combination of organic fertilizer with the155
chemical one is recommended to mitigate the environmental damage caused by the
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latter and sustain soil fertility (Duan et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2018). Sustainability cer-
tification scheme has a potential role to play in escalating the proper utilization of
fertilizer9. Hence, we additionally include new hypothetical attributes related to the
application and purchase of organic fertilizer. The first is a requirement of organic160
fertilizer application. We specified three levels as shown in Table 2. The second level
is a usual recommendation from producers of organic fertilizer, while the third one is
an extreme case where farmers can only use organic fertilizers for tea farming. The
other two are benefits that farmers can obtain when purchasing organic fertilizers from
their certification group, namely free shipping and delayed payment. Although those165
services are rarely provided in reality, there are rooms for the incorporation. Certi-
fication always relies on the establishment of farmer organizations (FOs). Hence, in
addition to quality assurance, the FOs can introduce services related input purchases
to make the best use of their collective action (Poulton et al., 2010). We expect that
those new services attract more farmers into the certification program.170
Lastly, although it is not included in Table 1 and 2, we also test the impact of price
premium on farmers’ participation. The price premium is the most tangible benefit
for farmers to join a certification program. Hence, the elasticity of farmers to premium
levels is often examined in literature (Meemken et al., 2017; Ochieng et al., 2017). We
specified five levels of premium per one kilogram of certified dried tea: 0 VND; 5,000175
VND; 10,000 VND; 20,000 VND; and 40,000 VND. Those levels are decided based
on the results of the previous studies about the impacts of the certification on tea
selling price. It is noteworthy that the premium levels were not randomized at choice
task level but at the respondent level. The premium levels were assigned randomly to
respondents joining the choice experiment and were fixed across all choice tasks of a180
respondent. As such, the price premium could be regarded a scenario treatment for
the choice experiment10.
9International certification schemes, such as GlobalGAP and UTZ, have stringent guide-
lines for the application of fertilizers. In its official document, VietGAP also recommends
farmers to limit the use of chemical fertilizer while increase using organic fertilizer.
10Certification fees and price premiums are both pecuniary attributes. If both of them
are randomly assigned at the choice task level, the respondents might get confused easily.
Therefore, we randomized the levels of the certification fee at the choice task level, while the
levels of the price premium were randomized at the household level and remained unchanged
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3.2.2 Experiment procedure
Households joining in the randomized conjoint experiment followed a three-step pro-
cedure:185
(1) an RCT on household purchase of organic fertilizer,
(2) an RCA on preferences for hypothetical VietGAP scheme,
(3) a questionnaire-based interview for information on household tea production
and other income sources in 2017.
Elaboration of the RCT is skipped because it is out of the scope of this study.190
In brief, households were assigned randomly to three groups: a control group, an
information treatment group and a subsidy group. The outcome of interest is the
respondents’ immediate decision on purchasing an organic fertilizer product offered by
the project. After this decision-making, they continued to the randomized conjoint
experiment.195
This study constructed a scenario where one household decided whether to join hy-
pothetical VietGAP programs. First, to maintain the respondent’s full understanding
of VietGAP, the investigators briefly introduced the purpose and main requirements
of VietGAP11. The respondent was then asked: “If there are hypothetical VietGAP
programs with the following features, we would like to know whether your household200
wants to join the programs or not”. The choice tasks, as an example is shown in Figure
1, were then presented to the respondent.
Each choice task contained 3 alternatives: A and B were to join hypothetical
VietGAP programs with corresponding attributes, while C meant not to join the
program. The investigators explained thoroughly the meaning of each attribute in205
the alternatives A and B. Importantly, hypothetical levels of the price premium for
participation in VietGAP programs were introduced. If the respondent chose either A
across all choice tasks of a household. Before each choice task, the investigators were required
to mention the price premium again.
11In all selected communes, there were active VietGAP groups, and VietGAP training was
also conducted by local officers. Hence, the respondents usually had a decent knowledge of
the program. Before the introduction, the investigators confirmed whether a household was a
member of any VietGAP group. The non-members were given a more detailed introduction
of the program.
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or B, their certified tea would be purchased at the market unit price of the non-certified
tea plus the premium.
In every choice task, the levels of the five attributes in alternative A and B were210
fully randomized following Hainmueller et al. (2014). The order of the attributes was
also randomized by households to eliminate any ordering effects. However, for one
household, the level of the price premium was fixed across all choice tasks.
After confirming the respondent’s complete understanding of the scenario, the
investigators asked him/her to rank the three options. The investigators first asked215
the respondent to name the alternative s/he liked the most, which is numbered 1.
After that, among the rest two options, the respondent was asked to choose which s/he
preferred, numbered 2. The rest option was numbered 3. Each respondent repeated
the choice task five times.
3.3 Estimation of causal impacts220
We adopt a framework proposed by Hainmueller et al. (2014) to estimate causal the
impacts of the attributes on farmers’ decisions. The causal quantity estimated from
the new RCA design is the average marginal component effect (AMCE). AMCE of
an attribute level measures the marginal impact of that attribute level, compared to
a baseline level of the attribute, on choice probability of a hypothetical alternative.225
In this section, we use notations from Hainmueller et al. (2014) to demonstrate how
AMCE is estimated.
Consider a scenario where each respondent i in a sample of N completes K choice
tasks. In each choice task kth ∈ K, respondent i choose from or ranks J hypothet-
ical alternatives. A hypothetical alternative (a profile) consists of L attributes, and230
attribute l has Dl levels. The alternative faced by respondent i in alternative jth of
kth choice task is denoted as Tijk, and Tijkl represent lth attribute of the alternative.
Yijk denotes choice outcome of respondent i for alternative jth of choice task kth
The AMCE is estimated based on two assumptions. The first assumption is no
effects of the round of choice tasks and the order of alternatives on choice outcomes12.235
12Under this assumption, Yijk and Tijkl can be simply referred as Yij and Tijl
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The second is full randomization. Under these two assumptions, AMCE of a change
in the level of attribute l from t0 to t1 is defined by the following equation
ˆ¯pi(t1, t0) = Y¯ij|Tijl=t1 − Y¯ij|Tijl=t0 (1)
where Y¯ij|Tijk=t1 and Y¯ij|Tijk=t0 are the conditional average of observed choice
outcomes.
Nonparametric estimators of the AMCE of attribute levels can be obtained by240
linearly regressing observed outcome Yij on dummy variables for the levels of Tijl.
The linear regression model is as follows:
Yij = β0 +
L∑
l=1
Dl−1∑
d=1
βldWijl + u (2)
where Wijl is the vectors of Dl−1 dummy variables for the levels of Tijl excluding
the one for Tijl = t0. βld is the AMCE estimator of a change in attribute l from
t0 to td. A robust standard error of the AMCE, also estimated from the regression245
model, is clustered at the respondent level to correct for correlations between choice
outcome within one respondent. Since the two assumptions of the new RCA design
can be easily satisfied, this method offers a powerful tool to study the causal impacts
of design attributes on choice probability13.
Because there are three alternatives in total in each choice task, there are two250
choice results. In external choice, the choice outcome takes on the value 1 (Yijk = 1) if
a hypothetical VietGAP program (alternative A or B) is preferred to no-participation
(alternative C), and 0 otherwise. In internal choice, Yijk = 1 if a hypothetical VietGAP
program is preferred to the other VietGAP alternative in the same choice task, and
0 otherwise. Since the main objective is to examine how the design attributes affect255
the participation in VietGAP programs, this section only reports results of external
choice. Results for internal choice are shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
In addition to design attributes, this study also estimates the impacts of the price
13Many recent studies have applied this method to measure the causal effects of program
attributes in different contexts (e.g., Gampfer et al., 2014; Hninn et al., 2017; Sydavong et al.,
2019).
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premium on the choice outcome. Because the levels of the price premium is a random
scenario for all choice tasks, their impact on the choice probability of VietGAP can260
be estimated by a similar linear regression. Standard errors of these estimators are
also clustered by respondents as the premium levels are randomly assigned at the
respondent level. We then compare the impacts of price premium and that of the
certification fee.
Finally, we estimate conditional AMCEs see heterogeneity in the impacts of the265
attributes. In detail, we first estimate AMCEs conditional of VietGAP membership.
VietGAP members and non-members are different in their experience of the certifica-
tion program as well as other background characteristics. Hence, it is compelling to
investigate if there are differences in the preferences between the two groups. Further,
because the RCA was conducted after the RCT in the first step, one may concern that270
AMCEs estimators are affected by the treatments of the RCT. The two treatments,
i.e., information provision and subsidy, are designed to support the trial purchase of
an organic fertilizer product. Therefore, they might affect treated farmers’ preferences
of attributes related to organic fertilizer. We estimate AMCEs conditional on RCT
treatments to investigate such interactions.275
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Of 750 household representatives participated in the RCA, five did not completed all
the choice tasks. These five are excluded from our analysis, leaving a final sample of
745 households.280
Table 3 indicates mean comparisons in household characteristics between the col-
lected sample of this study and that of Tran and Goto (2019) – a study conducted
in four tea-producing centers of Thai Nguyen province. First, there are some statisti-
cally significant differences in demographic variables. Households in the new sample
have a slightly smaller size and are less likely to be female-headed. Differences in the285
education level of household head and market distance are only marginally significant.
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Second, landholdings are very similar between the two samples, while asset holdings
reveal considerable differences. Households in the recent data are worse off regarding
all indicators of asset holdings, including motorbike ratio, computer dummy, and car
dummy. This is reasonable since Dai Tu is an economically disadvantaged district in290
Thai Nguyen province.
Due to the above differences, the sample might not well represent the population of
smallholder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen province but are more specific to tea farmers
in Dai Tu district.
4.2 AMCEs of the design attributes295
Results of AMCEs for the external choice analyses are illustrated in Figure 214. Specif-
ically, the certification fee has a strong and negative effect on VietGAP participation.
An increase in the fee from zero to 1 million/ ha reduces joining likelihood by nearly
7 percentage points on average (p < 0.01). From that level, every doubling of the fee
additionally leads to an average drop of around 6 percentage points in the choice prob-300
ability of the VietGAP program (p < 0.01). Removal of mandatory record-keeping
has an insignificant impact on joining VietGAP, which indicates record keeping does
not necessarily prevent smallholder farmers from producing certified products
In addition, attributes related to organic fertilizer reveal statistically significant
effects on VietGAP choice. Although harvest-based application combined with chem-305
ical fertilizer does not lead to any significant changes in the external choice, it has
a marginally positive impact of about 2.5 percentage points in the internal choice
(p < 0.1). By contrast, the extreme requirement of only using organic fertilizer for tea
farming strongly reduces the choice likelihood of VietGAP by 15 percentage points or
so (p < 0.01). Moreover, free shipping for organic fertilizer purchased through Viet-310
GAP groups does not significantly make VietGAP more attractive than the opt-out.
Whereas, delayed payment options do have a positive impact of around 3.5 percentage
points (p < 0.05).
Figure 3 demonstrates a comparison between the impact of the certification fee
14Values of estimated coefficients are shown in table A.1 in the Appendix
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and that of the price premium on external choice. The average productivity of tea315
farmers in the sample is approximately 1.8 dried ton/ha/year15. Therefore, a minimum
premium of 5,000 VND/ dried kg would be more than enough to cover a fee of 8
Million/ ha over a 2-year period of the certificate. However, insignificant impacts
of the price premium levels can be seen from the figure. Only when the premium
rises to 40,000 VND/ dried kg that it has a positive impact of about 8 percentage320
points (p < 0.05). Meanwhile, as explained above, farmers’ choice of VietGAP is
highly sensitive to increases in VietGAP fee. A fee level of 8 Million VND/ha reduces
participation probability by nearly 26 percent (p < 0.01). Thus, the results highlight
a considerable gap between the impacts of the two pecuniary attributes.
4.3 Conditional AMCEs325
External AMCEs of the certification attributes conditional on VietGAP membership
are indicated in Figure 4. Overall, the impacts are almost similar between the two
groups. The only significant difference is in the impact of delayed payment for organic
fertilizer purchased through VietGAP group. For the current VietGAP members,
impacts of 30-day and 60-day delays are close to zero. Meanwhile, for the nonmembers,330
both levels show positive impacts of 6 and 5 percentage points respectively. We also ran
a regression model incorporating interaction terms between levels of delayed payment
and VietGAP membership to confirm the statistical significance of the differences.
The results of the regression model are shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Lastly, Figure 5 describes AMCEs conditional on RCT treatment status for exter-335
nal choice. The requirement of applying organic fertilizer is the attribute which shows
significant interactions with the RCT treatments. The direction of the interaction
effects, however, contradicts our expectation. Since RCT treatments increase the or-
der of the organic fertilizers16, We anticipated them to have positive interactions with
the VietGAP requirement of applying organic fertilizer. Nonetheless, while harvest-340
15This is roughly equivalent to fresh productivity of 9 ton/ha since it usually takes 5 kg of
fresh tea to produce 1 kg of dried one.
16We confirmed the positive impacts of both RCT treatments on the order probability and
order amount of the organic fertilizer using statistical tests and regression models.
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based application increases the choice of VietGAP by about 7 percentage points in
the control group, its positive impact significantly diminishes and becomes indifferent
from zero in both subsidy and information treatment groups. Likewise, compared to
the control group, sole application organic of fertilizer has a more negative impact on
VietGAP participation in the two treatment groups17.345
5 Discussion
The results show significant impacts of the selected attributes on VietGAP partici-
pation. This section discusses the interpretation of the estimated results and justifies
their relative magnitudes.
It can be easily recognized that the certification fee is the most influential factor.350
This finding partially helps explain a very high dropout rate of certified members
once the local government ceases subsidy for the VietGAP fee. Although there were
no available statistics at either provincial or national level, during the survey, few
VietGAP groups renewed their license after the end of their subsidized period. The
large gap in the impacts between the certification fee and the price premium further355
emphasizes the problem. Farmers usually have to pay for the fee at the beginning of the
certification process. Even the hypothetical profit gain from the premium can fully
cover the initial payment, it generally cannot compensate for the negative impacts
of the former. Strict budget constraints and heavily discounted future benefits of
small farmers are possible interpretations. Another reason might come from farmers’360
skepticism about a guaranteed premium that did not exist in reality.
In addition, there is potential to incorporate attributes related to organic fertilizer
in VietGAP scheme. While an extreme requirement of using only organic fertilizer is
obviously not acceptable, a harvest-based application combined with chemical fertiliz-
ers may not deprive the participation. The latter even shows positive effects in some365
analyses. It is understandable since many respondents had partly realized the damages
17Significant and negative coefficients of the interaction terms with harvest-based applica-
tion, shown in Table A.3 in the Appendix , are found for both subsidy treatment (p < 0.05) and
information treatment (p < 0.1) The negative interaction term between only-organic-fertilizer
and information treatment is also statically significant (p < 0.01).
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of overusing synthetic fertilizers by the time of the survey. Supplementation of organic
fertilizer was also widely recommended. VietGAP, with a principal goal of achieving
sustainable agriculture, can provide a systematic motivation for the combined appli-
cation of fertilizers. Moreover, higher participation can be achieved through benefits370
related to group purchase of organic fertilizer. Delayed payment tends to have more
consistent positive effects than free shipping. Due to significant improvement in road
systems and fertilizer outlets, shipping fee might not constitute a significant part of
the fertilizer price. However, rescheduled payment is reasonably preferred by farmers
with restricted budgets.375
Finally, this section explores the reasons behind the heterogeneity in the estima-
tion of the AMCEs. Compared to the nonmembers, VietGAP members only differ
significantly in their preference for delayed payment for organic fertilizers. However,
such a difference could not be solely attributed to the membership itself. Because the
VietGAP participation is self-selected by a household, there are various confounders380
of the membership status18. For example, the negative interactions are possibly due
to the better wealth status of the members.
In contrast, the RCT treatments are completely randomized, so causal interpre-
tation is plausible. Findings from marketing studies could explain the unexpected
negative interactions between the RCT treatments and the hypothetical requirement385
of applying organic fertilizers. Accordingly, although both information and subsidy
treatments successfully encouraged the trial purchase of organic fertilizer, their pro-
motional effects on choice of VietGAP scheme with mandatory application of organic
fertilizer subject to unfavorable conditions. In particular, a regular application of or-
ganic fertilizer in a 2-year period of VietGAP is a strict requirement for farmers, and390
there is no certainty about its efficiency. Promotions on a feature for which consumers
have an uncertain preference can hurt the choice probability of a product (Simonson
et al., 1994). Similarly, Darke and Chung (2005) argued a negative perception of the
product caused by price promotion when its quality is not assured. Moreover, the
18Using the current sample, we ran t-tests to examine differences in background character-
istics between the VietGAP members and the non-members. We found significant differences
in demographics, land holdings and asset holdings between the two groups.
16
procedure of the experiments might have probabilized negative interactions. Imme-395
diately after receiving the treatments and making a decision on trial purchase, the
respondents were asked to choose VietGAP plans with the potential obligation of us-
ing organic fertilizer. This might unexpectedly provoke a misunderstanding among the
treated groups that the investigators strategically enforced them to buy the organic
fertilizer in the long-term. As a result, they avoided VietGAP plans with organic400
fertilizer application required.
6 Conclusions
To conclude, this study investigates smallholder farmers’ preferences of a certification
program. A randomized conjoint experiment was conducted on 745 small-scale green
tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. The experiment requires farmers to decide405
whether to participate in hypothetical VietGAP programs for tea production. At-
tributes were randomly assigned to each option (profile), consisting of certification
fee, record keeping, application of organic fertilizer, free shipping for organic fertilizer,
and delayed payment for organic fertilizer. Price premiums of the certification scheme
were randomly assigned at the household level. The study shows two important find-410
ings. First, the certification fee has a very strong negative impact on participation
decisions. Second, harvest-based application of organic fertilizer does not reduce the
participation probability, while delayed payment for organic fertilizer can slightly en-
hance participation.
The findings of this study could give policy-makers and certification entities in-415
sightful implications for the design of certification schemes for groups of small-scale
farmers in general.
From the second findings, certification entities could possibly include supplemen-
tation of organic fertilizer in the scheme with payment benefits for the members.
Combined application of organic and synthetic fertilizer, a sustainable farming prac-420
tice, can be incorporated into the protocol for certified production. As it is required
in well-known international standards, such as GlobalGAP, fertilizer application must
17
be based on soil conditions and in consultation with experts. Therefore, certification
bodies may collaborate with agricultural experts to prescribe a proper mixture ratio
of organic and non-organic fertilizers based on local soil conditions, before requiring425
compliance from the farmers. At the same time, delayed payment for group purchase
of organic fertilizers can be introduced by certification parties. Agreements on input
purchase with input suppliers are one of the plausible services offered farmer groups
(Poulton et al., 2010). Such collective purchase of agricultural inputs was emerging in
the study sites, where government bodies acted as a facilitator for the connection be-430
tween farmer groups and input providers. Certification parties also have the capacity
to substitute the governments’ role in such multilateral agreements.
However, based on the first findings, policies dealing with certification fees are
crucially important. The large initial fee could heavily prevent small farmers from
joining the certification programs which, although, might improve selling prices and435
farm income later. Low demand caused by large initial costs is also seen for other agri-
cultural services such as crop insurance (Casaburi and Willis, 2018). To reduce the
cost burden, a prevalent approach is subsidies from governments or NGOs. Nonethe-
less, this could make a sustainability certification program itself become unsustainable
and distort the production of certified commodities. Other sustainable solutions to440
the problem caused by the certification fee are highly necessary. Agreements on the
sharing of certification fees with wholesale buyers or a combination of public and
private financing of certification are also promising alternatives (OECD, 2018). In
addition, based on the findings of a positive impact of delayed payment for the pur-
chase of organic fertilizer, the same implication could be applied for the certification445
fee. For instance, rescheduled payment of certification fee, such as monthly or annual
installment payment, could reduce the financial burden effectively for the participants.
One major shortcoming of this study is the validity of farmers’ stated preference.
There are a range of causes for the biased choice in the survey, such as hypotheti-
cal bias, social desirability bias, and other cognitive bias (Krosnick and Judd, 2014;450
Schwarz, 1999). As such, their stated preference in the survey might differ from the
revealed preference when they make the actual choice in reality. However, the recent
18
work of Hainmueller et al. (2015) demonstrated that conjoint analyses have the pos-
sibility to reflect real-world behavior. This study also followed their recommendation
in using paired conjoint design to maintain the credibility of the stated choice. The455
study sites – 9 communes in Dai Tu district – also have favorable conditions for the
conjoint experiment due to the high familiarity of farmers with VietGAP program.
Therefore, the reliability of the stated preference could not be a severe issue of the
experimental results.
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1Coef. S.E
Certification fee
VND 1 Mil -0.07*** 0.02
VND 2 Mil -0.13*** 0.02
VND 4 Mil -0.19*** 0.02
VND 8 Mil -0.26*** 0.02
Record keeping
No 0.01 0.01
Application of organic fertilizer
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.02 0.01
Only organic fertilizer -0.14*** 0.02
Free shipping for organic fertilizer
Yes 0.01 0.01
Delayed payment for organic fertilizer
30 days 0.04*** 0.01
60 days 0.03** 0.01
Constant 0.71 0.02
n 7418
*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Table A.1: Regression coefficients of AMCEs for external choice
32
1Coef. S.E.
VietGAP dummy
yes 0.23*** 0.04
Certification fee
VND 1 Mil -0.06*** 0.02
VND 2 Mil -0.14*** 0.02
VND 4 Mil -0.21*** 0.03
VND 8 Mil -0.28*** 0.03
Certification fee # VietGAP dummy
VND 1 Mil#yes -0.02 0.03
VND 2 Mil#yes 0.02 0.04
VND 4 Mil#yes 0.05 0.04
VND 8 Mil#yes 0.03 0.04
Record keeping
No 0.01 0.01
Record keeping # VietGAP dummy
No#yes 0.00 0.02
Application of organic fertilizer 
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.02 0.02
Only organic fertilizer -0.12*** 0.02
Application of organic fertilizer # VietGAP dummy 
Harvest-based (chemical combinable)#yes 0.00 0.03
Only organic fertilizer#yes -0.04 0.03
Free shipping 
Yes 0.01 0.01
Free shipping # VietGAP dummy 
Yes#yes 0.00 0.02
Delayed payment 
30 days 0.06*** 0.02
60 days 0.05*** 0.02
Delayed payment # VietGAP dummy
30 days#yes -0.06** 0.03
60 days#yes -0.05* 0.03
Constant 0.62 0.03
n 7418
*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Table A.2: Heterogenous effects by VietGAP membership
33
1*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Coef. S.E.
RCT treatment
Information 0.04 0.05
Subsidy 0.05 0.05
Application of organic fertilizer
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.07*** 0.02
Only organic fertilizer -0.08*** 0.03
Application of organic fertilizer # RCT treatments
Information#Harvest-based (chemical combinable) -0.09 0.04
Information#Only organic fertilizer -0.05 0.04
Subsidy#Harvest-based (chemical combinable) -0.06* 0.03
Subsidy#Only organic fertilizer -0.11*** 0.04
Free shipping 
Yes 0.00 0.02
Free shipping # RCT treatments
Information#Yes 0.04 0.03
Subsidy#Yes 0.01 0.03
Delayed payment
30 days 0.06** 0.02
60 days 0.07*** 0.02
Delayed payment # RCT treatments
Information#30 days -0.03 0.03
Information#60 days -0.03 0.03
Subsidy#30 days -0.04 0.03
Subsidy#60 days -0.07* 0.04
Constant 0.55 0.03
n 7418
Table A.3: Heterogenous effects by RCT treatments
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